The First Word:  The President\u27s Place in  Legislative History by Dessayer, Kathryn Marie
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 2 
1990 
The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History" 
Kathryn Marie Dessayer 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Legislation Commons, and the President/Executive Department 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kathryn M. Dessayer, The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History", 89 MICH. L. REV. 399 
(1990). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol89/iss2/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE 
The First Word: The President's Place in "Legislative History" 
Legislative history, in its broadest sense, includes all relevant events oc-
curring before final enactment. In its narrower, more usual, and legally 
most controversial sense, it refers to the "relevant events comprising the 
enactment process."1 
Courts have identified certain sources outside the text of statutes as 
particularly relevant pieces of legislative history for statutory interpre-
tation purposes.2 Courts interpreting statutes use these "extrinsic 
aids" to provide background information about the circumstances that 
led to the enactment of the statute, to highlight the mischief at which 
the statute was aimed, or to signal the goal of the legislation. 3 Sue-
1. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPUCATION OF STATUTES 137 (1975) 
(footnote omitted). 
2. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTION § 48.01, at 277 (4th ed. 1984) 
[hereinafter SurnERLAND]. 
3. Id. at § 48.03, at 290. The regular appeal to extrinsic sources originally appeared, in the 
context of constitutional interpretation, in the Court's early years when, expounding upon the 
Constitution, it referred frequently to the Federalist Papers. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 
(6 Wheat.) 264, 418 (1821) ("The opinion of the Federalist has always been considered as of great 
authority •••• Its intrinsic merit entitles it to this high rank; and the part two of its authors 
performed in framing the constitution, put it very much in their power to explain the views with 
which it was framed."). The Court then expanded the use of extrinsic aids to help in defining the 
scope of certain federal statutes. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 
457, 459 (1892) (The Court reasoned that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."). A 
period followed during which courts were reluctant to use any extrinsic sources; they subscribed 
generally to the "plain meaning'' rule. See, e.g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 
166 U.S. 290, 318 (1896) ("There is, too, a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in 
Congress are not appropriate sources of information from which to discover ip.e meaning of the 
language of a statute passed by that body."); Red C. Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agric., 172 F. 695, 
711 (E.D.N.C. 1909) ("The law as it passed is the will of the majority of both Houses, and the 
only mode in which that will is spoken is the act itself; and we must gather their intention from 
the language [] used ..•. ") (quoting Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 9, 24 (1845)); 
Nelson v. Southern Ry. Co., 172 F. 478, 485 (N.D. Ga. 1909) ("The colloquy between Senators 
.•• cannot be properly considered in construing this statute."). A trend toward a more liberal 
use of such aids gradually developed, causing the courts to use legislative history almost as a 
matter of routine. See, e.g., Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476 (1943) (holding that 
the court below erred in refusing to consider legislative history of a revenue act); United States v. 
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 562 (1940) ("It would be anomalous to close our minds to persuasive 
evidence of intention on the ground that reasonable men could not differ as to the meaning of the 
words. Legislative materials ... can scarcely be deemed to be incompetent or irrelevant."); 
United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (Expressly disregarding 
the plain meaning rule, the Court stated that "[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of 
words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule oflaw' which forbids its 
use .••. "). 
Indeed, the recent trend has been toward an ever-greater reliance on legislative materials. 
During the ten-year period ending in 1979, the Supreme Court cited three times as many legisla-
tive historical documents as in the ten-year period ending in 1947. Carro & Brann, The U.S. 
Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 
399 
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cinctly stated, the rationale behind using extrinsic aids is to discern 
Congress' intent:4 to find what the legislature meant to accomplish by 
enacting the particular statute. 5 
The search for relevant extrinsic aids has traditionally been con-
fined to a few classes- of mandarin materials. For example, courts fre-
quently rely on committee reports as documents that encapsulate 
legislative intent. 6 Courts routinely use committee reports because the 
reports "represent[] the considered and collective understanding of 
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed Iegisla-
tion."7 Typically including a section-by-section analysis of the partic-
ular provisions of a bill, committee reports identify the problems that 
gave rise to the need for new legislation; the reports then outline the 
294, 304 (1982). Moreover, the greatest increase in legislative materials cited occurred in the ten-
year period ending in 1979. Id. This may well signal a further increase in the use of legislative 
historical materials since 1979, and foreshadow growth in the future. But see Eskridge, The New 
Textualism. 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 656 (1990) ("In the last two Terms, the Court has been 
somewhat more willing to find a statutory 'plain meaning' and less willing to consult legislative 
history •••• "); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF JurncE OFFICE OF LEGAL PouCY, USING AND 
MlsUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1989). 
4. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 2, at§ 45.0S; Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 
476, 479 (1943) (asking in "what sense" Congress used a word in the statute); see also Commis-
sioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214 (1984) (The "sole task" of the Court in the statutory interpre-
tation problem of the case at bar is to determine legislative intent.); Train v. Colorado Pub. 
Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (citing cases which use legislative history to 
discern Congress' intent). But see FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352, 362 
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (The party whose intent the court is seeking includes "all the voting members of 
both Houses of Congress and ••. the President."). 
5. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND .APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). 
6. See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) ("In surveying legislative history we 
have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature's intent lies in the 
Committee Reports on the bill ••.• "); Carro & Brann, supra note 3, at 304 (Over a 40-year 
period, over 60% of the Supreme Court's citations to legislative history were references to com-
mittee reports.); Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOF• 
STRA L. REv. 1125, 1130-32 (1983). But see Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details, as 
opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come to the attention 
of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the committee's bill. And I think it time 
for courts to become concerned about the fact that routine deference to the detail of committee 
reports, and the predictable expansion in that detail which routine deference has produced, are 
converting a system of judicial construction into a system of committee-staff prescription." (foot-
note omitted)); Rothfeld, Read Congress's Words, Not Its Mind, Judges Say, N.Y. Times, Apr. 
14, 1989, at BS, col. 3 ("Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York publicly disavowed a 
portion of a conference committee report that indicated a change in the tax laws was intended to 
affect authors. In a letter to The New York Times, he wrote: 'I do not ever recall the subject's 
having been raised, nor does any Senator or Representative with whom I've talked. My best 
guess is that staff members wrote it into the report.' "). 
7. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). See w. EsKRIDGB & P. FRICKBY, LBGISLA· 
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 709 (1988) ("Most legislation is essen-
tially written in committee or subcommittee, and any collective statement by the members of that 
subgroup will represent the best-informed thought about what the proposed legislation is 
doing.''). 
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general solutions proposed by the bill. 8 The fact that committee re-
ports are relatively accessible for legislators to read and review bolsters 
the legitimacy of using committee reports for statutory interpretation.9 
Transcripts of congressional hearings are l~s useful for discerning leg-
islative intent because they are often one-sided:10 the majority of the 
witnesses testifying at a given hearing are likely to be proponents of 
that particular bill.11 Furthermore, it is unclear whether transcripts of 
committee hearings are reasonably available for review by the legisla-
tive audience.12 
In any event, the set oflegitimate "extrinsic aids" has been primar-
ily limited to materials that originate in Congress.13 Courts need to 
8. W. EsKRIDGB & P. FRICKBY, supra note 7, at 709. Conference committee reports usually 
contain the version of the bill passed by each chamber and the actions taken by the conference 
committee. Id. 
9. W. EsKRIDGB & P. FR!CKBY, supra note 7, at 709. 
10. Dickerson, supra note 6, at 1131. See generally G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: 
REsBARCH FOR TIIE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 37 (1979). 
11. See Pacific Ins. Co. v. United States, 188 F.2d 571, 572 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 
342 U.S. 857 (1951) (''The .•• legislative history referred to is an isolated excerpt from a state-
ment made by a witness before the congressional committee considering the legislation. As such, 
in our opinion, it is not entitled to consideration in determining legislative intent."); R. DICKER-
SON, supra note 1, at 174-75. Testimony given by opponents to the legislation at hearings is 
viewed as equally unhelpful. See Eskridge, supra note 3, at 639 ("[T]he views of those unsuppor-
tive of the proposed legislation 'are no authoritative guide to the construction of the legislation. 
It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory word is in doubt.'") (quot-
ing Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1951)); see also Austasia 
Intermodal Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 580 F.2d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (In 
interpreting a statute, courts should not accord undue weight to testimony given at congressional 
hearings because "views expressed by witnesses at congressional hearings are not necessarily the 
same as those of the legislators ultimately voting on the bill."). But see Shapiro v. United States, 
335 U.S. 1, 12 n.13 (1948) (When administrators participate in drafting and actively sponsor the 
particular provision being interpreted, courts accord some weight to their hearing 
presentations.). 
12. Dickerson, supra note 6, at 1131. For a general evaluation of the reliability of committee 
reports as opposed to hearings and floor debates, see Costello, Average Voting Members and 
Other ''Benign Fictions'': The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and 
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41-60. -
13. In Eskridge & Frickey's leading casebook on statutory interpretation, the authors devote 
16 pages of their "Extrinsic Sources of Statutory Interpretation" section to a discussion of com-
mittee reports, yet do not discuss the role of presidential documents in statutory interpretation. 
See W. EsKRIDGB & P. FRICKBY, supra note 7, at 709-17. Moreover, in a recent article by 
Eskridge, presidential messages are mentioned in a section entitled "Statements by Nonlegisla-
tors," but are not listed on the "Hierarchy of Legislative History Sources." See Eskridge, supra 
note 3, at 632-33, 636. 
The Supreme Court makes only sparse use of presidential materials. A Lexis search for "ex-
ecutive" or words with the root "president-" reveals that in opinions from October 1989 to July 
1990, the Supreme Court used presidential legislative materials for statutory interpretation pur-
poses on only three occasions, and then applied them only perfunctorily. See California v. Amer-
ican Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1861-66 (1990) (reviewing the history of the Clayton Act and 
citing President Wilson's 1914 address to Congress, which called for the strengthening of anti-
trust laws); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737, 1740-41 & n.7 (1990) (reviewing the history 
of§ 1983 and citing President Grant's message urging the enactment of the K.lu Klux Klan Act); 
Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997, 1005-06 (1990) (citing President Kennedy's message to 
Congress calling for a wholesale revision of the conflict of interest laws). On the other hand, a 
Lexis search for "S. Rep." or "H. Rep." indicates that the Court considered committee reports in 
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consider, however, the entire legislative background of statutes, and 
not limit their investigations into legislative history to certain, ready 
extrinsic aids. 14 As Justice Frankfurter remarked: "If the purpose of 
construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logically 
relevant should be excluded."15 Statutes are "organisms which exist 
in their environment."16 Therefore, when interpreting a statute, 
courts should attempt to understand the full legislative background of 
that statute, not just the prepackaged scenario. 
The common use of legislative history in statutory interpretation17 
makes the determination of the appropriate set of extrinsic aids ex-
tremely important. In particular, courts should pay attention to rele-
vant presidential materials since the President plays an active role in 
proposing and propelling the development of particular legislation.18 
The near-exclusive focus on congressional materials, however, seems 
to presume that all statutes originate in Congress, that bills are actu-
ally conceived out of the independent thought and judgment of indi-
vidual members of Congress.19 This profoundly misrepresents the 
legislative process. 20 
twenty-nine cases. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 58 U.S.L.W. 5053 (1990); Maislin 
Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 2759 (1990); Portland Golf Club v. Commis-
sioner, 110 S. Ct. 2780 (1990); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 110 S. Ct. 2510 (1990); Sullivan v. 
Stroop, 110 S. Ct. 2499 (1990); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990); English v. 
General Elec. Co., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990); INS v. Jean, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990); Begier v. IRS, 110 
S. Ct. 2258 (1990); Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143 (1990); Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. 
Welfare v. Davenport. 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990); United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 110 S. Ct. 
2072 (1990); Fort Stewart Schools v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 110 S. Ct. 2043 (1990); 
Davis v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2014 (1990); North Dakota v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 1986 
(1990); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 110 S. Ct. 1964 (1990); United States v. Rios, 58 
U.S.L.W. 4525 (1990); Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990); Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570 (1990); Crandon v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 997 
(1990); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 110 S. Ct. 945 (1990); Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 110 
S. Ct. 929 (1990); Preseault v. ICC, 110 S. Ct. 914 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 110 S. Ct. 885 
(1990); John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 110 S. Ct. 471 (1989); United States v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 110 S. Ct. 462 (1989); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 6, 
110 S. Ct. 424 (1989); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989); Northbrook Natl. 
Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 110 S. Ct. 297 (1989). 
14. See Starr, Observations about the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 374 
(1987) ("The neutral, dispassionate judge will ... seek to understand the environment whence 
the statute came."). 
15. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REV. 527, 541 
(1947); see also Population Institute v. McPherson, 797 F.2d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (The 
purpose and function of looking at legislative history of statute is to find out what Congress 
meant by enactment, and although many elements of legislative history represent pieces of the 
puzzle of discerning legislative intent, no one piece, no matter how clear and unequivocal, is 
alone dispositive.). 
16. Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 541. 
17. See supra note 3. 
18. See infra Part I. 
19. See R. EGGER & J. liARRis, THE PRESIDENT AND CoNGRESS 82 (1963) ("Few of the 
fifteen thousand bills introduced in each Congress are the brain-children of its members."). 
20. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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Although some courts have used presidential materials to interpret 
statutes, they have done so sporadically - citing specific reasons for 
reliance on such materials, such as the lack of better indications of 
legislative intent, or unusually intense executive branch involvement in 
the development of the legislation.21 Due to the regular influence the 
President has in the legislative process, it is curious that courts give 
presidential materials such limited attention and sparse application. 
This Note examines the extent to which courts interpreting stat-
utes should consider presidential participation in the legislative pro-
cess. Part I concludes that courts should afford presidential input 
greater weight in statutory interpretation given the constitutional 
foundations and the empirical reality of the President's involvement in 
the lawmaking process. This conclusion follows from an examination 
of the President's authority to propose legislation and his power to 
review legislation via the presentment clause. To demonstrate the ad-
vantages of using presidential documents, Part II considers a series of 
cases in which courts used executive documents in the statutory inter-
pretation process. Although federal courts have used presidential doc-
uments only sporadically, state courts have found many successful 
ways to use executive materials in statutory interpretation. Part III 
addresses the practical problems and constitutional concerns associ-
ated with using presidential documents for statutory interpretation 
purposes, and determines that they are illusory. This Note concludes 
that in many cases, although not all, presidential participation com-
prises a large part of the legislative process and, therefore, considera-
tion of presidential documents and messages should constitute a 
regular part of courts' statutory interpretive analysis. 
I. THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
The point of using legislative history is to discern Congress' intent. 
Therefore, it might, at first inspection, seem strange to suggest that 
presidential documents could contain any indicia of legislative intent. 
After all, Congress manifests its final intentions by voting for a particu-
lar statute. What the legislators are thinking, however, and, by logical 
extension, what they have read, constitutes "legislative history." The 
materials individual legislators consider when voting for a particular 
piece of legislation, therefore, are of critical importance. Due to the 
pervasive influence of the President in initiating certain federal legisla-
tion and in the presentment phase of lawmaking, such materials may 
well include presidential documents. In many cases, presidential doc-
uments present most of the issues Congress considers in its lawmaking 
deliberations. 
21. See generally infra section II.A. 
404 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:399 
A. The President as the Originator of Legislation 
From George Washington, who "wrote down his ideas for a bill on 
the national militia,"22 to George Bush, who recently sent Congress a 
draft of the Clean Air Act Amendments, 23 Presidents have initiated 
innumerable pieces of national legislation. 24 Section I.A. I reviews the 
President's constitutional power to propose federal legislation. Section 
1.A.2 explores the increasing use of this power and examines the scope 
of the President's role in proposing new legislation. 
1. The Constitutional Prescription 
The United States Constitution specifically vests "All legislative 
Powers herein granted" in the two Houses of Congress.25 Despite this 
clear constitutional assignment of legislative power to Congress, the 
President retains a role in the development of legislation. Presidential 
participation in the initiation stage of the legislative process finds its 
constitutional warrant in article II: "He shall from time to time give 
to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recom-
mend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary 
and expedient .... " 26 The compulsory language in the Constitution 
makes presidential proposals of legislation a duty.27 James Madison's 
notes from the Constitutional Convention reveal that the Framers spe-
cifically designed the recommendation clause to place an affirmative 
obligation on the President: "On motion of Mr Govr Morris, 'he may' 
22. L. FlsHER, THE Pm.mes OF SHARED POWER: CoNGRESS AND TIIE EXECUTIVE 33 
(1981). 
23. President's Message to Congress Transmitting The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, 
25 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1136 (July 24, 1989). 
24. See, e.g., All States Freight, Inc. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 379 
U.S. 343, 349-50 (1964) (stating that immediate genesis of certain provisions in the Interstate 
Commerce Act seem to have stemmed from a special message to Congress by President Taft); 
Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104 n.14 (1957) (''The Federal Communications Act was 
the response to a Presidential message calling to the attention of Congress the disjointed exercise 
of federal authority over the forms of communication."); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 8 
(1948) ("On July 30, 1941, the President of the United States, in a message to Congress, re-
quested price-control legislation conferring effective authority to curb evasion and bootlegging." 
This request served as the genesis for the Emergency Price Control Act.); United States v. Silk, 
331 U.S. 704, 710 (1947) (''The Social Security Act of 1935 was the result oflong consideration 
by the President and Congress of the evil burdens ..• of the insecurities of modem life, particu-
larly old age and unemployment."); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 492 (1945) 
(presidential message encouraged Congress to create legislation to abolish the existence of child 
labor); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1917) ("[The Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act] was drafted and passed shortly following a message from the President 
advocating an adequate national law covering all such injuries •••• "). 
25. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1. 
26. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3. The President's power, shared with the Senate, to make treaties, 
U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, is another instance of executive influence on the legislative process. 
And as one additional source of influence, which has been exercised on rare occasions in the past, 
the President has the power to convene both Houses of Congress on extraordinary occasions and 
adjourn them in cases of disagreement between them. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3. 
27. See Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2081-98 (1989). 
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was struck out, & 'and' inserted before 'recommend' in the clause 2d. 
sect. 2d art: X. in order to make it the duty of the President to recom-
mend .... "28 Although the recommendation of measures constitutes 
a mandatory presidential function, the frequency and scope of such 
proposals vary according to the motivations of different Presidents. 
Nevertheless, Presidents have faithfully presented messages since Pres-
ident Washington's first term.29 
As important as what the Constitution contains on the subject of 
proposing legislation,30 however, is what it does not contain. Specifi-
cally, nothing in the text of the Constitution forbids the President 
from actively participating in the legislative arena. The nonexistence 
of such a constitutional provision has attracted attention for 
generations: 
In the United States the failure openly to give to the President consti-
tutional powers by the exercise of which he can influence the passage of 
legislation, and the adoption of policies, has naturally led to the develop-
ment of somewhat secret and indirect, if not underhand, methods. The 
President cannot introduce a bill into Congress. But there is nothing to 
prevent him from having a bill drawn and inducing one of his supporters 
in Congress to introduce it. The President has no power to send a repre-
sentative of the administration to participate in the debates in Congress. 
But members of the administration are often heard by the committees of 
Congress to which bills are referred, and the President may easily per-
suade some member of the legislature to be his spokesman on the floor of 
either of the houses.31 
Of course the lack of constitutional restraint on the President's ability 
to influence the legislature does not translate directly into substantial 
presidential participation in the lawmaking process. Rather, such a 
dearth of constitutional restrictions merely creates the potential for 
presidential leadership;32 thus the expansion of the presidential role in 
the legislative process has depended largely on how individual Presi-
dents have chosen to use their influence. 33 For all practical purposes, 
however, the constitutional duty to propose legislation, coupled with 
the lack of constitutional restraints on the President's ability to influ-
ence the legislative process, has left the President in an excellent posi-
28. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 405 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) 
(emphasis in original). 
29. R. EGGER & J. HARRis, supra note 19, at 49. 
30. In addition to the constitutional provision requiring the President to propose measures to 
Congress, certain federal statutes specifically direct the President to submit recommendations to 
the legislature. The two principal documents which the President sends to Congress each year 
are the budget message, required by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, and the economic 
report, prescribed by the Employment Act of 1946. L. FlsHER, supra note 22, at 23. 
31. F. GOODNOW, PRINCIPLES OF CoNSTITUTIONAL GoVERNMENT 121 (1916). 
32. See infra section I.A.2. 
33. The Constitution does not, of course, require Congress to consider or adopt the Presi-
dent's recommendations. Congress thus retains the power to decide how to act, or not to act, on 
the proposals of the President. 
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tion to participate actively in the lawmaking process on a regular and 
fairly uninhibited basis. 
2. The Presidential Practice 
Although the Constitution prescribes presidential performance of a 
few enumerated legislative duties, 34 designing an annual legislative 
program and exerting influence to further its adoption were not origi-
nally part of the President's responsibilities. Nonetheless, these func-
tions have developed over time, largely as a consequence of 
presidential initiative on many crucial policy issues.35 Today, they 
have become expectations of the modem office and part of the criteria 
by which administrations are evaluated.36 Consequently, many meas-
ures introduced in Congress each year are actually the original ideas of 
the President or of executive departments, simply sponsored by a se-
lected member of Congress. 37 As one commentator observed of the 
1961-1966 period: 
[T]he major legislative impulses ... came from a single source - the 
White House. Members of Congress could retard, accelerate, or deflect 
those impulses, and they could expand, limit or modify the specific pro-
posals initiated from the White House. But they could not set in motion 
the legislative stream itself. Constitutionally, they had every right to do 
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text and infra note 59 and accompanying text. 
35. President Theodore Roosevelt introduced the now-common practice of using messages to 
Congress to initiate a broad spectrum of legislative proposals. M. JEWELL & S. PATTERSON, 
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 252 (3d ed. 1977); R. EGGER & J. HARRIS, 
supra note 19, at 49 ("The contribution of Theodore Roosevelt ••. was two·fold: first, he used 
the address on the State of the Union to present his legislative demands to the Congress with a 
vigor and insistency new to the traditions of presidential communication; second, and much 
more important, he brought into public view and legitimized the practice of sending bills from 
the White House to the Capitol as avowed administration measures."). President Wilson empha-
sized his legislative proposals by appearing in person before Congress. Id. at 50; M. JEWELL & 
S. PATTERSON, supra, at 252. President Harry Truman, however, was the true inventor of the 
comprehensive legislative program. s. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE PRESIDENCY 102 (1978). In 
1948, President Truman used his three required messages to Congress, the State of the Union 
Address, budget message, and economic report, to convey his legislative platform. Id. 
36. See S. WAYNE, supra note 35, at 102 ("[A]nnual programming [has become] an expecta-
tion of the modem presidency. Today, Congress anticipates it, the public assumes it, depart-
ments and agencies demand it, and presidents have provided it, usually announcing parts of their 
program even before taking office."). 
The first 100 days of an Administration are viewed as particularly crucial for the President. 
See Meisler, Catching Public Fancy Early Is Key Bush Task, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1988, at 1, col. 
5 (''To ensure a place in history and in the hearts of Americans, according to a modem political 
axiom, a new President must catch the fancy of the public with new and imaginative ideas that he 
swiftly implements, preferably in the first 100 days."). 
37. See supra note 19. Interest groups and private lobby groups also commonly propose 
legislation to Congress. See, e.g., Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 
221 (1979) (noting that the bill eventually enacted was based largely on one introduced by a 
private interest group); cf. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2176 
n.12 (1989) (The court acknowledged that publishers' and artists' groups were instrumental to 
the development of the Copyright Act, and used a joint memorandum to interpret the Act.). 
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so. Theoretically, perhaps, they had the opportunity. Practically, they 
did not.38 
During every session of Congress, the President sends to Capitol 
Hill hundreds of reports, messages, communications, and suggestions 
for legislation. 39 Major policy innovations often require presidential 
initiative.40 Waiting for the President to propose legislation has be-
come so common in modem times41 that members of Co:Q.gress have 
actually begun to expect the administration to present a bill as a start-
ing point for consideration of new policies and governmental actions.42 
Legislative leadership exhibited by the President has been the sub-
ject of a substantial volume of recent political science literature.43 
38. J. SUNDQUIST, PoLmcs AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON 
YEARS 489 (1968); cf. G. GALLOWAY, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN CoNGRESS 38 (1953) 
("For most measures introduced [legislators] are merely conduits for the executive departments, 
private organizations, and individual constituents."). 
39. L. FISHER, supra note 22, at 23. 
40. In 1975, Representative Alan Steelman admitted: 
The legislative body can never be depended on to be the initiator. • • • There are just too 
many of us in the House. . . • Our role is to properly air options and to come up with some 
response. We are reduced to a reaction role to presidential policy initiatives, which can be a 
good working of checks and balances. 
A. MAAss, CoNGRESS AND THE CoMMON GooD 15 (1983). 
41. Representative Orval Hansen once remarked that 
The president has become a principal legislator. The Congress does expect and often 
awaits the presidential initiatives in major areas. The congressional activity is usually one of 
response. It is significant that you hear a lot of criticism of the president from time to time 
that he hasn't sent up the program so we can't really do anything. I think this is a trend that 
is now irreversible. 
S. WAYNE, supra note 35, at 139 (quoting Representative Hansen on an unspecified occasion). 
See also Barnes, Leaders to Follow, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 14, 1990, at 18, 20 (''Today's 
Democrats have settled into a comfortable partnership that the president, because he gets more 
press coverage, is bound to dominate. 'It's much harder for us to be on the offense,' laments 
[House Majority Leader Richard] Gephardt. 'The Congress is not meant to be the leading force 
in the country. It's set up to be a check on presidential power. It can put an imprint on things. 
From time to time, it can set policy, but that's rare.' "). 
42. See R. EGGER & J. HARRIS, supra note 19, at 83 ("Congress increasingly looks to the 
President to submit a legislative program and devotes most of its attention to his proposals. 
Formerly protocol limited the President to general reco=endations of policy, leaving the draft-
ing of bills to members of Congress. Jealous of its prerogatives, Congress once returned a petty 
bill submitted by President Lincoln with a request that it be passed, declining even to consider it. 
Formerly bills to carry out the President's reco=endations were bootlegged to friendly mem-
bers of Congress to be introduced as their own, without indicating the source, but today Con-
gress expects the President ..• to submit draft bills to carry out his reco=endations.''); M. 
MEZEY, CoNGRESS, THE PRESIDENT & PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1984) ("[T]oday Congress often 
refuses to move in a policy area until it has a specific proposal from the White House.''); Neu-
stadt, Presidency and Legislation: Planning the President's Program, 49 AM. PoL. Sci. REv. 980, 
1015 (1955) (quoting one committee chairman advising an executive branch official: "[D]on't 
expect us to start from scratch on what you people want. That's not the way we do things here 
- you draft the bills and we work them over.'') (emphasis in original). 
43. See, e.g., BOTH ENDS OF THE AVENUE (A. King ed. 1983); N. BOWLES, THE WHITE 
HOUSE AND CAPITOL HILL (1987); G. EDWARDS, AT THE MARGINS: PRESIDENTIAL LEADER-
SHIP OF CoNGRESS (1989) [hereinafter G. EDWARDS, AT THE MARGINS]; G. EDWARDS, PRESI-
DENTIAL INFLUENCE IN CoNGRESS (1980) [hereinafter G. EDWARDS, PRESIDENTIAL 
INFLUENCE]; A. MAAss, supra note 40; J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND REsURGENCE OF 
CoNGRESS (1981); cf. M. MEzEY, supra note 42. 
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Political scientist Arthur Maass concluded: 
The legislature is not the dominant influence in the legislative process. 
The President is more influential. He leads and Congress controls. 
Leadership in this context means two things: to initiate the legislative 
process, that is, to perform its early stages, and to impel it, or to continu-
ously drive the process forward. 44 
Maass articulates four main reasons for the strength of the President's 
leadership in the legislative process. First, the legislative process nor-
mally involves recognizing a problem and asking whether new legisla-
tion is a desirable solution.45 A President's personal leadership is 
likely to be particularly useful for this task because the office requires 
national popular election and commands extensive press coverage. 46 
Second, once an issue is raised, the beginning stages of the legislative 
process are mostly devoted to soliciting and identifying possible solu-
tions to the particular problem and to focusing on the more promising 
altematives.47 This part of the process entails gathering a tremendous 
amount of information. Although the legislature may be able to attain 
the necessary expertise on a particular issue through the use of com-
mittees, the executive branch, with its massive professional establish-
ment, is generally better suited to provide this type of data. 48 Third, in 
the early stages of the legislative process, policy proposals need to be 
coordinated and consistent. 49 According to Maass, the hierarchical 
executive branch, led by the President, is better able to perform this 
type of central coordination than the legislature, which is decentral-
ized due to its committee-based organization.5° Finally, having initi-
ated a legislative proposal, the President is in the position "to push 
politely but relentlessly"51 for enactment of a proposal, by clearing it 
44. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 10. 
45. Id. 
46. Id.,· cf. N. MAsTERS & M. BALUSS, THE GROWING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY 17 
(1968) ("One factor in the growth of presidential power is the development of radio, television, 
and the press as dominant facts of modern American life, as the Presidency becomes more and 
more the center of an incredibly extensive mass-media attention."); N. BOWLES, supra note 43, at 
8 ("Presidents' decisions to make legislative initiatives are affected by public circumstances and 
calculations of opportunity and interest •••. "); Barnes, supra note 41, at 20. 
47. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 10. 
48. Id. 
49. Id.; see also G. EDWARDS, AT THE MARGINS, supra note 43, at 1 (explaining that 
"[e]xtraconstitutional processes, such as the preparation of an elaborate legislative program in 
the White House, have evolved in response to the system's need for centralization"). 
50. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 10. Cf. Cohen, Presidential Responsibility and American 
Democracy, in THE PROSPECT FOR PRESIDENTIAL-CoNGRBSSIONAL GOVERNMENT 23 (1977) 
("[T]he President's constituency is the nation, not a district, not a state, not a party. He bears a 
continuing responsibility to the nation; he can speak with one voice; the members of Congress 
cannot. Congressional power is diffused among its members, whose constituencies are states or 
districts. Leadership in the Congress is also diffused among competing centers of power; leaders 
must share their authority with the chairmen and ranking members of the important 
committees."). 
51. C. ROSSITBR, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 110 (2d ed. 1960). 
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with interested parties who may not have been involved in choosing 
the preferred solution, by recommending it, and by working for its 
adoption. sz 
Maass's theory has two implications for statutory interpretation. 
First, if the "legislature is not the dominant influence in the legislative 
process,"s3 the concentrated and often exclusive use of legislative his-
tory in the form of committee reports, committee hearings, and floor 
debates may be neither effective nor wise. A focus limited to congres-
sional materials is thus underinclusive. 
Second, to the extent that the President plays a sweeping role in 
the development of federal legislation, Congress' legislative role is con-
fined to "critici[sm] and control."S4 If Congress is relegated to the 
task of responding reactively to the presidential legislative proposals, 
then Congress must work from White House documents, messages, 
and drafts, retaining some of the President's proposed measures while 
rejecting others. Overlooking these presidential proposals in an analy-
sis of legislative history thus seems irrational, especially when a 
stronger expression of congressional intent can be found in a pointed 
congressional rejection of a certain presidential proposal. ss In the 
same respect, if the legislature fails to reject a proposition ingrained in 
a legislative draft that originates in the White House, then it implicitly 
adopts the President's original intent. s6 
52. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 10; see G. EDWARDS, PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE, supra 
note 43, at 202 ("Certainly presidents have successfully intervened [in the legislative process] 
with a phone call, bargain, threat, or amenity, occasionally winning a crucial vote because of 
such an effort."). 
Different Presidents have pursued the enactment of specific legislation to varying degrees. 
For instance, President Lyndon Johnson believed that "[t]here is but one way for a President to 
deal with the Congress, and that is continuously, incessantly, and without interruption." D. 
KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 226 (1976) (quoting President John-
son's remarks in a personal interview with the author). "Merely placing a program before Con-
gress," President Johnson wrote separately, "is not enough. Without constant attention from the 
administration, most legislation moves through the congressional process at the speed of a gla-
cier." L. JOHNSON, THE v ANTAGE POINT 448 (1971). President Kennedy similarly felt that he 
would have to take an "active, aggressive role with Congress" in order to ensure the passage of 
his programs. L. O'BRIEN, No FINAL VICTORIES 109 (1974). In contrast, President Nixon 
apparently knew little about the workings of Congress and cared even less. R. EVANS & R. 
NOVAK, NIXON IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE FRUSTRATION OF POWER 106 (1971). 
53. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
54. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 11. 
55. The rejection of proposed language by Congress is probative because it is direct evidence 
that Congress considered the issue and decided not to adopt the specific policy. See, e.g., Tanner 
v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 123-25 (1987); Burlington N. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Mainte-
nance of Way Employes, 481U.S.429, 439 (1987); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 419 U.S. 186, 200 
(1974); cf. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) ("Few principles of statutory 
construction are more compelling than the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio 
to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.") (quoting 
Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392-93 (1980) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting)). 
56. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 1, at 145 n.19 ("Nonlegislative intent becomes legislative 
intent so far as the legislature impliedly adopts the intent of the outsider."). 
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Many bills introduced in Congress stem from presidential recom-
mendations, 57 and many of them are accompanied by presidential 
messages or executive branch memoranda. These documents describe 
the purpose of the proposed legislation and reveal the intent of its initi-
ators. Insofar as Congress considers such documents, they are rele-
vant to legislative history. Thus, courts should pay attention to 
documents which record the President's significant role in proposing 
legislation. 58 
B. Presentment and the President 
A key step in the legislative process occurs when a bill is presented 
to the President for approval. Section I.B.1 reviews the constitutional 
requirement to present pending federal legislation to the President for 
final approval or rejection. Section l.B.2 explores the practical uses, 
for statutory interpretation purposes, of presidential documents from 
the presentment stage of the lawmaking process. 
1. The Constitutional Prescription 
Article I of the Constitution includes the President in the legisla-
tive process by giving him the power to review all federal legislation 
via the presentment clause: "Every Bill which shall have passed the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a 
Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve 
he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it ... . " 59 The requirement of 
presentment confers upon the President a formal and official role in 
the legislative process. 60 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that "[t]he President is a participant in the lawmaking process by vir-
tue of his authority to veto bills enacted by Congress."61 
If at the presentment stage the President vetoes the legislation, 62 
57. See supra note 24. It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many bills currently proposed 
by the President are passed by Congress. However, the following statistics, compiled from the 
Congressional Quarterly, shed some light on the matter: President Eisenhower submitted 1,515 
proposals between 1954 and 1960, of which Congress approved 684; President Kennedy submit· 
ted 1,054 proposals between 1961 and 1963, of which Congress approved 414; and President 
Johnson submitted 1,902 proposals between 1964 and 1968, of which Congress approved 1,091. 
2 CoNGRESS AND THE NATION 625 (1969). 
58. Cf. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential "Signing State-
ments," 40 ADMIN. L. REv. 209, 212 (1988) ("If the President is considered an actor in the 
passage oflegislation, his statements presumably should be accorded some weight in interpreting 
such laws."). 
59. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
60. Of course, the President's signature is not an absolute requirement for a bill to become a 
law. A bill can become law by a congressional override of a President's veto. U.S. CoNST. art. I, 
§ 7, cl. 2. 
61. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976). 
62. If, by contrast, the President signs the bill, the bill automatically becomes law. It is a 
co=on practice for the President to present a signing statement at such time. Whether presi-
dential signing statements should be included as part of the legislative history is beyond the scope 
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the Constitution requires that the bill be returned to the House where 
it originated "who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, 
and proceed to reconsider it."63 The Constitution thus requires that 
the veto message be taken into consideration. Logging veto messages 
as part of the official legislative record ensures accessibility of the 
messages for review by legislators and reinforces the President's place 
in legislative history. 
2. The Presidential Practice 
The constitutional requirement of presentment forces legislators to 
bear in mind the President's views on potential legislation in order to 
avoid a veto. 64 As one scholar of congressional-executive relations 
noted: "The mere existence of the possibility of a presidential veto is 
sufficient normally to produce reasonably careful consultation of the 
President's views on the form and substance of pending legislation . 
• • • " 65 The Framers appreciated the power contained in the Presi-
dent's veto when they included the presentment clause in the Constitu-
tion. Alexander Hamilton wrote of the veto power: 
A power of this nature in the executive will often have a silent and un-
perceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in unjustifi-
able pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter 
which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare ap-
prehension of opposition from doing what they would with eagerness 
rush into if no such external impediments were to be feared. 66 
Practical application of presentment thus means that legislation passed 
by both Houses of Congress, but substantially inconsistent with a 
President's views, is unlikely to be approved by the President. Con-
gress therefore must tailor its legislative product to prevent a presiden- · 
of this Note. For information regarding the efficacy of using presidential signing statements in 
statutory interpretation, see Cross, supra note 58, at 222-24; Garber & Wimmer, Presidential 
Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of 
Power, 24 HARV. J. LEGIS. 363, 367 (1987); Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis 
of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GEO. L. REV. 755 (1987); Greenhouse, In Signing Bills, 
Reagan Tries to Write History, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1986, at B14, col. 3. 
63. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
64. See M. JEWELL & s. PATl'ERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
310 (1966) (''The threat to veto a bill can frequently lead legislators to improve the bill in order 
to make it acceptable."); M. MEzEY, supra note 42, at 103 ("[B]y threatening to veto proposals 
he dislikes, the president can encourage Congress to make changes that would render the bill 
more acceptable to him."). Political scientist Richard Neustadt recognized Congress' precarious 
position with respect to understanding the President's legislative wishes: 
With hardly an exception, [those] who share in governing this country are aware that at 
some time, in some degree, the doing of their jobs, the furthering of their ambitions, may 
depend upon the President of the United States. Their need for presidential action, or their 
fear of it, is bound to be recurrent if not actually continuous. Their need or fear is [the 
President's] advantage. 
R. NEUSfADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 35 (1960) (emphasis in original). 
65. R. EGGER & J. HARRIS, supra note 19, at 51. 
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
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tial veto. 67 The presentment requirement is even more rigorous for 
Congress if the President initially proposed the legislation, thereby 
having previously articulated his views on the legislation. In these in-
stances, it may be additionally difficult to avoid a presidential veto if 
the legislation has been significantly altered. 68 
On a practical level, a presidential veto message may prove helpful 
for statutory interpretation purposes in two particular instances. 
First, a presidential veto message can aid statutory interpretation if 
Congress successfully overrides the veto. Since a veto message ordina-
rily concentrates on the provisions of the rejected bill, 69 and since it 
seems reasonable to assume that the legislature considers the criticisms 
the President offers, 70 the veto message and Congress' response stand 
as important parts oflegislative history. On the one hand, ifthe Presi-
dent gives his interpretation of the bill and Congress responds vehe-
mently by rejecting that interpretation and emphasizing an alternative 
interpretation, then the courts have a great insight into legislative in-
tent. 71 On the other hand, if the President interprets the bill and Con-
gress overrides the veto without rejecting the President's 
interpretation, then the courts can rationally use the President's view 
to support their interpretation. 72 In such a case, Congress can be said 
to have agreed with the President's interpretation and enacted the bill 
anyway. 
The second way in which the presentment stage is applicable to the 
statutory interpretation process occurs when the President success-
fully vetoes a bill. Although a successful veto means that the original 
bill never becomes law, a similar bill may well be passed later in its 
stead. If the President signs the subsequent bill, courts should be able 
to use the President's veto message from the original bill to infer that 
the later bill takes into account the objections and policy preferences 
of the President. 73 In this capacity, the President's veto message 
67. Although there exists the possibility of a legislative override of the President's veto, the 
prospect of obtaining the required two-thirds majority is slim. Congress was able to override 
only 94 of the 1,380 regular vetoes by Presidents Washington through Carter. L. FISHER, supra 
note 22, at 25. See M. MEzEY, supra note 42, at 61-62. 
68. For an example, see infra note 73. 
69. See, e.g., Presidential Veto Message, 133 CoNG. REc. H10054 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1987) 
(vetoing H.R. 8617, a bill that would have essentially repealed the Hatch Act); Presidential Veto 
Message, 133 CoNG. REc. S8438 (daily ed. June 23, 1987) (vetoing S. 742, the "Fairness in 
Broadcasting Act of 1987"); Presidential Veto Message, 133 CoNG. REc. H504-05 (daily ed. Feb. 
2, 1987) (vetoing H.R. 1, the "Water Quality Act of 1987"). 
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
71. For an example, see infra notes 100-06 and accompanying text. 
72. See United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 139 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the re-
sult) ("In the debate preliminary to the overriding of the veto, none of the legislators in charge of 
the measure gave any indication that they differed with the President's interpretation."). 
73. For example, on April 16, 1956, President Eisenhower vetoed a farm price support bill. 
See Veto of the Farm Bill, PUB. PAPERS 1182 (Apr. 16, 1956). Three months earlier, on January 
9, 1956, in a special message to Congress, President Eisenhower had recommended an expansive 
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serves, for statutory interpretation purposes, as a statement of what 
the later bill does not mean. 74 
The combination of the power to propose legislation and the power 
to veto means that the President may, in some circumstances, exercise 
the first and last say in the enactment of federal legislation.75 Presi-
dential documents may shed light on a statute's meaning by revealing 
what Congress was told a bill meant - and therefore what Congress 
probably thought the bill meant. These documents may also provide a 
chance for Congress to say for itself what a bill meant, by endorsing or 
rejecting the President's interpretation. Courts should therefore con-
sider, when exploring the "legislative history" of a given statute, the 
President's role in developing that statute. Until now, however, courts 
have generally ignored this aspect of the legislative process; they have 
therefore neglected to explore the whole legislative history of some 
statutes. 
II. LIMITED PAST APPLICATION 
Historically, there have been a few instances in which the Supreme 
Court, recognizing the important role the President plays in the law-
making process, has used executive documents to interpret statutes. 76 
Although this Part highlights a series of cases in which courts did use 
executive documents, the discussion should not obscure the point that 
courts too rarely consider presidential materials. 77 This short survey 
of cases merely serves to show how executive materials can be used 
effectively when courts face difficult statutory interpretation questions. 
A. In Federal Court 
A classic example of the Court's use of a presidential message to 
new nine-point Farm Program. See Special Message to Congress on Agriculture, PUB. PAPERS 
1l 6 (Jan. 9, 1956). Unsatisfied with the ensuing farm legislation passed by Congress, President 
Eisenhower, in his veto message, not only identified the provisions of the legislation that he found 
inadequate and unworkable, but he suggested compromise measures that he would approve. See 
Veto of the Farm Bill, supra. Congress eventually passed a bill containing provisions acceptable 
to President Eisenhower, see H.R 10875, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), and therefore he signed the 
subsequent bill. See Statement by the President upon Signing the Agricultural Act of 1956, PUB. 
PAPERS 1! 115 (May 28, 1956). 
An examination of the political climate may be necessary to determine why the President 
approved the subsequent similar legislation. Perhaps the President changed his mind, or perhaps 
the President did not want to be overridden by Congress for other political reasons. 
74. See, e.g., Amalgamated Assn. of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 392 n. 15 (1947) (using an earlier bill's veto message to 
show Congress's rejection of a similar position in a later bill). 
75. See supra section I.A. 
76. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 103, Intl. Assn. of Bridge Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 347 n.9 
(1978) (citing, among other things, a presidential transmittal letter that recommended adopting a 
draft of labor reform legislation); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 
U.S. 616, 629 n.8 (1975) (citing a presidential message calling for labor reform legislation). 
77. See supra note 13. 
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assist in its interpretation of a statute is Johnson v. Southern Pacific 
Co. 78 In Johnson, the Court examined an act of Congress which pro-
vided that a railroad employee "injured by any locomotive, car, or 
train in use contrary to the provision of this act" would not be deemed 
to have assumed the risk ofinjury.79 The issue was whether operating 
a locomotive without automatic couplers violated section 2 of the Act, 
which required automatic couplers on "cars."80 
The court of appeals had held that the Act's coupler restrictions 
applied only to "cars" and not to "locomotives."81 Because another 
section of the statute specifically addressed locomotives, requiring 
them to be equipped with particular safety equipment (but not auto-
matic couplers), the court of appeals inferred that if Congress had 
wanted to include locomotives in section 2, it would have referred to 
both cars and locomotives. 82 
The Supreme Court, however, found that Congress had used the 
word "car" in its generic sense in section 2, and that the Act "plainly 
forbade ... the use of cars which could not be coupled together auto-
matically by impact .... "83 The Court felt that this interpretation of 
the scope of the statute was supported "by the circumstances sur-
rounding its enactment .... "84 The Court specifically noted that 
President Harrison, in his annual messages of 1889, 1890, 1891, and 
1892, had urged Congress to enact legislation to "obviate and reduce 
the loss of life and the injuries due to the prevailing method of coup-
ling and braking."85 In his first message to Congress, President Harri-
son stated: 
It is competent, I think, for Congress to require uniformity in the con-
struction of cars used in interstate commerce, and the use of improved 
safety appliances upon such trains. . . . It is a reproach to our civiliza-
tion that any class of American workmen should, in the pursuit of a 
necessary and useful vocation, be subjected to a peril of life and limb as 
78. 196 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1904). 
79. Act of Mar. 2; 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893). 
80. Section 2 provided in pertinent part: 
[l]t shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on 
its line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling auto-
matically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of men going be-
tween the ends of the cars. 
Act of Mar. 2, 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (1893). 
81. Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 117 F. 462, 466 (8th Cir. 1902). The lower court had 
refused to test the meaning of the provision in question against the broad purpose of the statute. 
See Johnson, 117 F. at 465. 
82. Johnson, 117 F. at 466. 
83. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 15-16. The locomotive and the other car in question were in fact 
equipped with automatic couplers, but the couplers on each were of different types and could not 
be coupled with each other automatically. Workers therefore had to go between the cars to 
couple and uncouple. 
84. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 19. 
85. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 19. 
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great as that of a soldier in time of war. 86 
President Harrison reiterated his recommendation in a subsequent 
message to Congress: 
Statistics furnished by the Interstate Commerce Commission show that 
during the year ending June 30, 1891, there were forty-seven different 
styles of car couplers reported to be in use, and that during the same 
period there were 2,660 employes killed and 26,140 injured. Nearly 16 
per cent of the deaths occurred in the coupling and uncoupling of cars, 
and over 36 per cent of the injuries had the same origin. 87 
The Court reasoned that, given the persistence of reports such as 
these, Congress clearly had in mind that the couplers would eliminate 
the need for railroad workers to go between any two cars; whether or 
not one of the cars happened to be a locomotive was not particularly 
relevant. 88 
The impetus for the Act in Johnson came from the White House; 
quite naturally, therefore, presidential documents prove helpful in in-
terpreting the Act. The Johnson case thus serves as a prime example 
of how courts can practically and productively use presidential 
messages as an aid in statutory interpretation. 
In a more recent case, United States v. Reitano, 89 the Second Cir-
cuit analyzed a presidential message to resolve a difficult interpretive 
question. In Reitano, the defendant was charged with conducting an 
illegal gambling business under the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970;90 specifically, he facilitated the playing of "rough-and-tumble" 
blackjack at his nightclub.91 The game of rough-and-tumble blackjack 
requires players to compete against each other: the gambling estab-
lishment collects the bets placed on each deal of the cards, retains a 
percentage, and then pays the winner from the bets collected.92 
The Act defines an "illegal gambling business" as one that, among 
other things, "has a gross revenue of $2,000 in a single day."93 In 
appealing his conviction, the defendant argued that since rough-and-
tumble blackjack involves no bets against the house, the amounts wa-
gered did not constitute "revenue" within the meaning of the Act. 94 
Unfortunately, Congress did not define "gross revenue" in the Act. 
The court reasoned, however, that "the-language used in the legislative 
history suggests that [Congress] meant that term to encompass all of 
the moneys coming into the possession of the gambling establish-
86. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 19. 
87. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 19-20. 
88. Johnson, 196 U.S. at 20. 
89. 862 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1988). 
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1988). 
91. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 984. 
92. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 984. 
93. 18 u.s.c. § 1955(b)(l)(iii) (1988). 
94. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 985. 
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ment."95 Specifically, the court noted that a message from the Presi-
dent "had urged Congress to adopt legislation making it a federal 
crime to engage in an illicit gambling operation from which the daily 
'take' was more than $2,000 .... " 96 In common usage, the court 
reasoned that the term "take"· referred to "the money received."97 
The court therefore concluded that "take" meant all the money col-
lected, despite the fact that some of the moneys the establishment col-
lected were paid to the winning bettors. 98 The Reitano case again 
illustrates the usefulness of presidential messages for statutory inter-
pretation purposes. 
Veto messages also can assist in statutory interpretation.99 A quin-
tessential example of the Supreme Court's use of a President's veto 
message and the corresponding congressional response is NLRB v. 
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. 100 In this Freedom of Information Act 
case, the Court sought guidance from President Ford's veto message. 
The message expressed concern that exemption 7(A) of the Act 
"would require the Government to 'proye . . . separately for each par-
agraph of each document - that disclosure "would" cause' a specific 
harm"101 in order to exempt that document from disclosure under the 
Act. Representative Moorehead, a key supporter of the bill, called the 
President's view "ludicrous."102 Senator Hart similarly remarked that 
"the 'burden is substantially less than we would be led to believe by 
the President's message.' " 103 These exchanges, garnered through the 
presentment stage of the legislative process, helped the Court to deter-
mine that the President's interpretation was far from the intent of 
Congress. Since Congress rejected the President's "ludicrous" view,104 
the Court deduced that Congress intended a more moderate interpre-
tation of the ability of the government agencies to conceal documents 
under exemption 7(A).105 A presidential veto message can be used to 
95. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 985. 
96. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 985 (citation omitted). 
97. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 985. 
98. Reitano, 862 F.2d at 985. 
99. See supra section II.B.2. 
100. 437 U.S. 214 (1978). 
101. Robbins, 437 U.S. at 235, quoting Presidential Veto Message, STAFF OP TIIE SUBCOMM. 
ON Govr. INFORMATION AND INDMDUAL RIGHTS OP TIIE HOUSE COMM. ON Govr. OPERA· 
TIONS, AND STAFF OP TIIE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OP TIIE SENATE 
CoMM. ON TIIE JUDICIARY, 94TII CoNG., lsr SESS., FREEDOM OP INFORMATION SOURCE 
BooK 483, 484 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter 1975 SOURCE Booe:]. 
102. 120 CoNG. REc. 36,623 (1974) (statement of Rep. Moorehead), reprinted in 1975 
SOURCE BooK 406, quoted in Robbins, 437 U.S. at 235. 
103. 120 CoNG. REC. 36,871 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart), reprinted in 1975 SOURCE 
BooK 450, quoted in Robbins, 437 U.S. at 235. 
104. Congress overrode the President's veto. See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). 
105. Robbins, 437 U.S. at 235-36. 
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eliminate competing interpretations and reach an interpretation close 
to the legislature's true intention.106 The Robbins decision highlights 
the applicability of veto messages in statutory interpretation. Ignoring 
such a blatant indication of legislative intent garnered through the use 
of presidential documents seems "ludicrous." 
Despite the three previously mentioned cases, the federal courts' 
use of presidential materials in statutory interpretation has been very 
sporadic. Usually the courts mention presidential materials only when 
there are no other indicia of legislative intent.101 Presidential docu-
ments should, however, be used on a regular basis for effective statu-
tory interpretation. 
B. In State Court 
The President's role in the legislative process finds parallels in 
most state systems because state executives are usually vested with the 
power to propose new state legislation.108 Interestingly, state courts 
commonly use gubernatorial statements and veto messages to discern 
legislative intent.109 
An illustrative example is found in Division of Agriculture v. 
Fowler. 110 The interpretive question before the court was whether ar-
106. For another example of the Court using a presidential veto message, see McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The question before the Court was whether 
Title VII prohibits racial discriprination in private employment against whites as well as blacks. 
The Court cited President Johnson's veto message recognizing that the bill attempted to fix "a 
perfect equality of the white and black races." McDonald, 427 U.S. at 295 n.26 (quoting Presi-
dential Veto Message, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1679 (1866)). 
107. See, e.g., Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 857 n.13 (1984) ("[I]n the absence of 
any direct evidence regarding how Members of Congress understood the provision ..• it seems to 
us senseless to ignore entirely the views of its [executive branch] draftsman."). 
108. With the exceptions of Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and 
Rhode Island, every state constitution contains a provision for the executive to propose legisla-
tion. See ALA. CoNST. art. V, § 123; ALAsKA CoNST. art. III, § 18; ARiz. CoNST. art. V, § 4; 
ARK. CoNST. art. 6, § 8; CAL. CoNST. art. v, § 3; CoLO. CoNST. art. IV, § 8; CoNN. CoNST. art. 
IV, § 11; DEL. CoNST. art. III, § 15; FLA. CoNST. art. IV, § l(e); GA. CoNST. art. V, § II, 11 VI; 
HAW. CoNST. art. V, § 5; IDAHO CoNST. art. IV,§ 8; ILL. CoNST. art. V, § 13; IND. CoNST. art. 
V, § 13; IOWA CoNST. art. IV,§ 12; KAN. CoNST. art. 1, § 5; KY. CoNST. § 79; LA. CoNST. art. 
IV, § 5(B); ME. CoNST. art. v, Pt. 1, § 9; MD. CoNST. art. II, § 19; MICH. CoNST. art. v, § 17; 
MISS. CoNST. art. 5, § 122; Mo. CoNST. art. IV, § 9; MONT. CoNST. art. VI, § 9; NEB. CoNST. 
art. IV, § 7; NEV. CoNST. art 5, § 10; NJ. CoNST. art. V, § I, 11 12; N.Y. CoNST. art. IV, § 3; 
N.C. CoNST. art. III, § 5, cl. 2; N.D. CoNST. art. V, § 5; OHIO CoNST. art. III, § 7; OKLA. 
CoNST. art. VI,§ 9; OR. CoNST. art. v, § 11; PA. CoNST. art. IV,§ 11; s.c. CoNST. art. IV, 
§ 18; S.D. CoNST. art. IV, § 3; TENN. CoNST. art. III, § 11; Tux. CoNST. art. IV, § 9; UTAH 
CoNST. art. VII, § 5; VT. CoNST. ch. II, § 20; VA. CoNST. art. V; § 5; WASH. CoNST. art. III, 
§ 6; W.VA. CoNST. art. VII, § 6; WIS. CoNST. art. V, § 4; WYO. CoNST. art. IV, § 4. 
109. See, e.g., Hammond v. Hickel, 588 P.2d 256, 271-72 & n.33 (Alaska 1978) (considering 
governor's veto of bill in determining legislative intent); Taplin v. Town of Chatham, 390 Mass. 
1, 4-5, 453 N.E.2d 421, 423 (1983) (including, as part oflegislative history, governor's communi-
cations to the legislature in returning bills); Fields v. Hoffman, 105 N.J. 262, 269-70, 520 A.2d 
751, 755 (1987) (considering press release from governor's office as part oflegislative history); cf. 
State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 947 (Alaska 1987) (using attorney general's response to a ques-
tion in order to interpret law originally proposed by executive). 
110. 611 P.2d 58 (Alaska 1980). 
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ticle 9 of Alaska's version of the Uniform Commercial Code111 applied 
to a security agreement between the state and a borrower.112 The 
Alaska legislature had expanded upon U.C.C. § 9-104, which defines 
the scope of article 9, by stating that article 9 does not apply "to a 
security interest created by or on behalf of the state."113 The appel-
lees, seeking to find the transaction outside of article 9, argued that in 
the Alaska version of the statute "by" refers to the state as a debtor, 
and "on behalf of" is synonymous with "in favor of" and refers to the 
state as a creditor.114 The court, however, reasoned that the phrase 
"on behalf of" conveyed the notion of an official acting for the state, 
and thus interpreted Alaska's amendment as inapplicable to the state 
as a creditor.m To arrive at this interpretation, the court considered a 
letter the governor had written to the legislature transmitting the pro-
posed amendment: 
It is difficult to believe that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial 
Code were intended to apply to the sale of public securities, yet through 
apparent inadvertency said transactions were omitted from the list of 
those transactions not governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. It is 
impractical to expect public entities such as the state and its subdivisions 
to comply with the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code when 
obtaining debt financing. Therefore, this bill is designed to clarify the 
true intent of the Uniform Commercial Code so that its scope cannot be 
misinterpreted.116 
The court reasoned that this letter clearly supported an interpretation 
limiting Alaska's amendment to situations in which the state is a bor-
rower.117 Such a letter from the executive, particularly one addressed 
to the state legislature, proved very useful in the statutory interpreta-
tion process. 
In another case, County of Milwaukee v. State Labor & Industry 
Review Commission, 118 the state court's interpretation of a statutory 
provision relied upon a governor's message attached as an appendix to 
a budget bill presented to the legislature for approval. The question 
before the court was whether section 111.36(1) of the Wisconsin Fair 
Employment Act was a statute of limitations subject to waiver or a 
statute concerning subject matter jurisdiction.119 The gubernatorial· 
111. ALAsKA STAT. § 45.05.754 (1980) (current version at ALAsKA STAT. § 45.09.312 
(1986)) (U.C.C. § 9-312). Under this statute, a perfected security interest will prevail over a 
prior unperfected interest, even if the perfecting party had notice of the prior interest at the time 
of perfection. 
112. Fowler, 611 P.2d at 59. 
113. ALAsKA STAT. § 45.05.696(12) (1980). 
114. Fowler, 611 P.2d at 60. 
115. Fowler, 611 P.2d at 60. 
116. Fowler, 611 P.2d at 60. 
117. Fowler, 611 P.2d at 60. 
118. 113 Wis. 2d 199, 204-05, 335 N.W.2d 412, 415-16 (Ct. App. 1983). 
119. Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d at 201-01, 335 N.W.2d at 414. 
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message outlined the governor's view as to the effect of a budget bill 
section. In particular, the governor's message stated that "Sections 
1007, 1010, 1053 and 1054 of the statutes, relates to placing a statute 
of limitations on equal rights cases .... " 120 The court noted that the 
legislature had adopted the governor's proposed bill without amend-
ment and then reasoned that "a court can ascertain that the legislature 
adopted the executive's intent behind a section contained in the budget 
bill if it goes through legislative scrutiny without amendment."121 The 
court found that the executive intent behind section 1053 of the budget 
bill was the creation of a statute of limitations.122 It reasoned that, 
due to the lack of explicit congressional response to the governor's 
message, the legislative intent behind section 111.36(1) was to make a 
statute of limitations and not a statute concerning subject matter juris-
diction.123 Recognizing that executive documents might shed light on 
a difficult interpretive question, the state court made use of an execu-
tive statement to discern legislative intent. 
Similarly, state courts have found gubernatorial veto messages pro-
bative for the statutory interpretation process.124 MacCuish v. Volks-
wagenwerk 125 raised the interpretive question of whether the 
Massachusetts wrongful death statute allowed recovery for "grief, 
anguish and bereavement of the survivors."126 When the legislature 
originally passed the bill, it contained three paragraphs regarding 
compensatory damages. The first allowed recovery of the "fair mone-
tary value" of the decedent, 127 the second allowed recovery of funeral 
expenses, 128 and the third allowed damages for "grief, anguish and 
120. Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d at 204, 335 N.W.2d at 415. 
121. Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d at 205, 335 N.W.2d at416. See supra note 56 and accompany-
ing text. 
122. Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d at 205, 335 N.W.2d at 416. 
123. Milwaukee, 113 Wis. 2d at 205, 335 N.W.2d at 416. 
124. Every state constitution, with the exception of North Carolina, provides for executive 
review of legislation: ALA. CoNsr. art. V, § 125; ALAsKA CoNsr. art. II, § 15; ARiz. CoNsr. 
art. V, § 7; ARK. CoNsr. art. 6, § 15; CAL CoNsr. art. IV, § 10; CoLo. CoNsr. art. IV, § 11; 
CoNN. CoNsr. art. IV, § 15; DEL. CoNsr. art. III, § 18; FLA. CoNsr. art. III, § 8; GA. CoNsr. 
art. V, §II, 11 IV; HAw. CoNsr. art. III,§ 16; IDAHO CoNsr. art. IV, § 10; ILL. CoNsr. art. IV, 
§ 9; IND. CoNsr. art. v, § 14; IOWA CoNsr. art. III, § 16; KAN. CoNsr. art. 2, § 14; KY. 
CoNsr. § 88; LA. CoNsr. art. III,§§ 17-18; ME. CoNsr. art. IV,§ 2; Mo. CoNsr. art. II,§ 17; 
MAss. CoNsr. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. II; MICH. CoNsr. art. IV, § 33; MINN. CoNsr. art. IV, § 23; 
Miss. CoNsr. art. 4, § 72; Mo. CoNsr. art. III, §§ 30-32; MONT. CoNsr. art. VI, § 10; NEB. 
CoNsr. art. IV, § 15; NEV. CoNsr. art. 4, § 35; N.H. CoNsr. art. 2, pt. 2, § 44; N.J. CoNsr. art. 
v, § I, 1[ 14; N.M. CoNsr. art. IV, § 22; N.Y. CoNsr. art. IV, § 7; N.D. CoNsr. art. v, § 9; OHIO 
CoNsr. art. II,§ 16; OKLA. CoNsr. art. VI,§ 12; OR. CoNsr. art. v, § 15b; PA. CoNsr. art. IV, 
§ 15; R.I. CoNsr. art. IX, § 14; s.c. CoNsr. art. IV, § 21; S.D. CoNsr. art. IV, § 4; TENN. 
CoNsr. art. III, § 18; TEx. CoNsr. art. IV, §§ 14-15; UTAH CoNsr. art. VII, § 8; VT. CoNsr. 
art. II,§ 11; VA. CoNsr. art. V; § 6; WASH. CoNsr. art. III,§ 12; w. VA. CoNsr. art. VII,§ 14; 
WIS. CoNsr. art. v, § 10; WYO. CoNsr. art. 4, § 8. 
125. 22 Mass. App. Ct. 380, 494 N.E.2d 390 (1986). 
126. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 394, 494 N.E.2d at 398. 
127. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 229, § 2 (1988). 
128. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 229, § 2 (1988). 
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bereavement of the survivors."129 After presentment,130 the governor 
deleted paragraph three before returning the bill to the legislature.131 
The governor explained the deletion, stating that he was not convinced 
that the statute "should also authorize ... compensation for [the items 
in paragraph 3]."132 The court reasoned that the legislature, in ap-
proving the governor's deletions, indicated that it did not intend to 
compensate for the excluded items.133 As a result of this interpreta-
tion, the court held that jury instructions excluding damages for be-
reavement would have been proper and advisable.134 This case serves 
as a straightforward illustration of the usefulness of executive veto 
messages.135 
State courts have used many different kinds of executive materials 
to assist them in discerning legislative intent.136 As Justice Brandeis 
aptly observed, it is one of the "happy incidents of the federal system" 
that state courts can function as the little laboratories of the federal 
court system.137 State courts' successes with using executive docu-
ments to interpret statutes justifies increasing the federal courts' use of 
presidential documents. 
III. THE PRESIDENT'S PLACE IN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Because the President has become a major player in the legislative 
process, it seems reasonable to consider presidential materials when 
exploring the "legislative history" of a given statute. Some courts 
have occasionally recognized the President's role in the lawmaking 
process and have taken the next logical step: using presidential docu-
ments as an aid to statutory interpretation.138 In general, however, 
courts remain unconvinced and rarely consider presidential docu-
ments. Section III.A focuses on the skepticism surrounding the legis-
lators' actual awareness of presidential documents, a key argument 
against using these documents. Section III.B analyzes the constitu-
129. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 394, 494 N.E.2d at 398. 
130. Under the Massachusetts constitution: 
No bill or resolve of the senate or the house of representatives shall become a law, and have 
force as such, until it shall have been laid before the governor for his revisal; and if he, upon 
such revision, approve thereof, he shall signify his approbation by signing the same. 
MAss. CoNST. pt. 2, ch. I, § I, art. II. 
131. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 394, 494 N.E.2d at 398-99. 
132. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 394 n.19, 494 N.E.2d at 399 n.19. 
133. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 394, 494 N.E.2d at 399. 
134. MacCuish, 22 Mass. App. Ct. at 397, 494 N.E.2d at 401. 
135. Although the U.S. President, unlike Massachusetts' governor, is not equipped with the 
line item veto, presidential veto messages can still identify the portions of the bill with which the 
President disagrees. 
136. For a collection of articles regarding state courts' uses of extrinsic evidence in statutory 
interpretation, see W. EsKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, supra note 7, at 697 n.j. 
137. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
138. See supra section II.A. 
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tional challenges associated with using presidential documents for 
statutory interpretation. Finally, section 111.C addresses concerns 
about expanding the relevant domain of legislative history sources. 
A. Legislators' Consideration of Presidential Documents 
In a recent case in which the Supreme Court used an executive 
branch document for statutory interpretation, Kosak v. United 
States, 139 Justice Stevens warned that nonlegislators' intent should not 
be attributed to Congress "without positive evidence that elected legis-
lators were aware of and shared the lobbyist's intent."140 This reflects 
one pragmatic reason for disregarding the President's role in the legis-
lative process: presidential documents may not be accessible to the 
legislative audience and therefore provide no indication of legislative 
intent.141 This argument mirrors the rationale behind the limited use 
of committee hearing transcripts:142 legislators may not have had 
ready access to them and therefore it would be unreasonable to assume 
that legislators had read them.143 
Many sources publish executive documents, however, which are 
readily available for legislators to read and review. The most compre-
hensive source for current presidential documents is the Weekly Com-
139. 465 U.S. 848 (1984). 
140. Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 863 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Kosak, 
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, used a report written by Judge Alexander Holtzolf, 
who was then serving in the executive branch as Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to aid 
in statutory interpretation. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 855-57. The question before the Court was 
whether a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, which exempts from its coverage "[a]ny 
claim arising in respect of • . • the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of 
customs," precluded recovery against the United States for injury to private property sustained 
when the Customs Service temporarily detained the property. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 849. Judge 
Holtzoff's report stated that the Act's exemption covered injury to detained property caused by 
the negligence of customs officials: it "include[s] immunity from liability in respect of loss in 
connection with the detention of goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise." A. 
HoLTZOFF, REPORT ON PROPOSED FEDERAL TORT Cl.AIMs BILL 16 (1931), quoted in Kosak, 
465 U.S. at 856. 
In interpreting the Act, the Court conceded that it was unsure whether Congress relied on 
this report when it enacted the legislation. Kosak, 465 U.S. at 856. The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that insofar as the "report embodied the views of the Executive Department at the stage of 
the debates over the tort claims bill, it is likely that, at some point, the report was brought to the 
attention of the Congressmen considering the bill." Kosak, 465 U.S. at 857 n.13. 
141. See, e.g., Forbes v. Maddox, 339 F.2d 387, 388 (9th Cir. 1964) (Lower court should not 
have relied on messages from the executive concerning a bill pending in the legislature because 
the legislature may not have been aware of them.). 
142. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
143. Committee reports, by contrast, are viewed as credible because they are so accessible to 
legislators. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. But see Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 
939, 947 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (noting that few members 
of Congress actually read committee reports). 
Justice Scalia frequently raises the argument that legislators are not aware of most of what 
presently composes "legislative history." See, e.g., Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Details oflegislative history do not come to the attention of mem-
bers of Congress.). 
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pilation of Presidential Documents. Since 1965, this weekly 
publication has printed executive documents, including transcripts of 
presidential addresses and fact sheets regarding pending legislation.144 
Both Houses of Congress publish official journals, the Journal of the 
House of Representatives of the United States and the Journal of the 
Senate of the United States of America, which briefly describe their 
proceedings, and often include messages from the President. U.S. 
Code Congressional and Administrative News occasionally prints presi-
dential signing statements145 as well as other executive messages and 
memoranda, but usually in a selective manner. 
The Congressional Record, however, stands as the best source for 
presidential messages. The Congressional Record has been published 
since 1873, 146 and is printed every day while either House of Congress 
is in session. The Congressional Record publishes communications to 
Congress by the President in the form of presidential messages. These 
messages include proposals of legislation, explanations of vetoes, 
transmissions of reports and other presidential documents. Thus, the 
Congressional Record is a fairly complete compilation of executive 
documents that is certainly available to every member of Congress. 
Despite the availability of information regarding the President's 
legislative proposals, whether legislators are ever actually aware of 
them is unclear. Most of the legislative information that individual 
members of Congress receive is synthesized from the massive litera-
ture that arrives in their offices and is channeled to them by their 
staff.147 Most likely, congressional staffs gain information about the 
President's position on particular legislation from the sources men-
tioned above and pass it on to the members of Congress.148 In this 
way, the President's views on pending legislation do, in some form, 
reach the legislators.149 
144. The Public Papers of the Presidents is an annual collection of the same type of materials, 
but it is arranged and bound in a final format. The bound Public Papers do not usually appear 
until several years after the original appearance of the materials. Therefore, they do not lend 
much assistance since legislators cannot consider them before voting on statutes. 
145. The Department of Justice under Attorney General Edwin Meese was responsible for 
first persuading the publishers of U.S. Code Congressional and Administratfre News to include 
presidential signing statements in their legislative history collection. See Natl. L.J., Mar. 10, 
1986, at 2; Toobin, The Last Word, New Republic, Nov. 3, 1986, at 13; Kmeic, Judges Should 
Pay Attention to Statements by President, Natl. L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 13. 
146. The precursors to the Congressional Record include the Annals of Congress, 1789-1824, 
the Register of Debates, 1824-1837, and the Congressional Globe, 1833-1873. 
147. See H. Fox & s. HAMMOND, CoNGRESSIONAL STAFFS 124-25 (1977); K. KOFMEHL, 
PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CoNGRESS 17-34, 118-19 (3d ed. 1977); see also M. MALBIN, 
UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 21, 143 (1979). 
148. Cf. J. SUNDQUJST, supra note 43, at 402-14. 
149. The Congressional Record is replete with examples oflegislators not only being aware of 
the President's views on legislation, but actually reiterating them. See, e.g., 136 CoNG. R.Ec. 
S8072 (daily ed. June 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("And it happens to be the view of 
President Bush, who has publicly threatened to veto any bill that contains a rigid spending limits 
proposal or provision [for campaign financing]."); 136 CoNG. R.Ec. S2439 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 
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B. Constitutional Concerns 
As previously mentioned, courts employ legislative history in the 
statutory interpretation process in order to discern congressional in-
tent.150 This Note argues that presidential documents, as indicators of 
legislative intent, should be included in the legislative history consid-
ered in the statutory interpretation process. Bringing the executive 
into the lawmaking process, however, seems to raise separation of 
powers concerns automatically. These concerns generally begin with 
the reminder that the Constitution vests "All legislative Powers" in 
Congress.151 Use of executive documents which purport to encapsu-
late the intent of the legislature in passing the bill is thus considered an 
executive intrusion into a legislative function. A complementary argu-
ment is that although making legislative history is not itself an exercise 
of article I lawmaking power, the creation oflegislative history derives 
whatever authority it has from the fact that article I legislators pro-
duced it, and in this regard, presidential documents do not contain the 
requisite legislative labor. 
Separation of powers concerns arising from the use of presidential 
documents in statutory interpretation, however, can be addressed on 
two levels. First, the Constitution sets the parameters for the legiti-
mate involvement of the President in the lawmaking process; specifi-
cally, it grants the President the power to propose and veto 
legislation.152 Therefore, in vetoing a bill passed by the legislature, for 
instance, the President should be perceived as operating in his legisla-
tive capacity.153 Thus there seems to be no intrusion on legislative 
"turf," and hence no separation of powers violation, because the Presi-
dent is simply acting out his specifically designated legislative func-
tion. Second, since the legislature reviews and considers both 
presidential proposals. and veto messages, 154 legislators have the op-
portunity to accept or reject the President's views expressed in presi-
dential documents. Due to this review by the legislators, presidential 
documents and messages become part of legislators' understanding of 
1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("But I am here, as I have indicated, reflecting the views of 
President Bush who wants this bill .•.• "); 136 CoNG. REc. S812 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1990) (state-
ment of Sen. McCain) ("This legislation is consistent in my view with President Bush's commit-
ment to U.S. leadership in global change research. Al; part of his fiscal year 1991 budget, 
President Bush proposed over $1 billion in funding for global change research, an increase of 57 
percent over the 1990 level."); 135 CoNG. REc. H7583 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1989) (statement of 
Rep. Lagomarsino) (recognizing that President Bush had expressed his views on the status of 
Puerto Rico one month earlier). 
150. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
151. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 1. 
152. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 3 and art. I, § 7, cl.2; see supra Part I.A.1 and I.B.1. 
153. Cf. Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wash. 2d 802, 810, 145 P.2d 265, 269 
(1944) ("In approving a bill passed by the legislature, the governor acts in a legislative capacity 
and as part of the legislative branch of the state government."). 
154. See supra section III.A. 
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the legislation - they become part of legislative intent. This Note 
maintains that presidential documents should be used only as evidence 
of legislative intent. This use of legislative intent obviates claims of 
aggrandizement of executive power and prevents circumvention of the 
'legislature in the lawmaking process. Ensuring that legislative powers 
remain with the legislature, in turn, avoids separation of powers 
problems.155 
The consequences of excluding presidential documents from the 
list of relevant sources of legislative history raises independent consti-
tutional questions. One general criticism of the present near-exclusion 
of presidential documents from legislative history is that it gives undue 
weight to one branch of the federal government.156 In particular, leg-
islative history which does not include presidential materials ignores 
the role of the Executive. "In carrying out his constitutionally or-
dained functions, the President passes upon legislation . . . . In this 
regard, the President's view of the statute may be different from that of 
Congress ... . " 151 The Framers specifically included the President in 
the lawmaking process for a reason: to prevent "the enaction of im-
proper laws."158 Even Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that when 
the Court reviews legislation, it is evaluating "the product of both 
Houses of Congress and the President."159 To this extent, the Presi-
dent's view should be taken into consideration in statutory interpreta-
tion; otherwise the judiciary is ignoring constitutionally prescribed 
executive functions. On this independent constitutional ground courts 
should take presidential documents into consideration in the statutory 
interpretation process. . 
C. Too Much Legislative History 
Some argue that courts have ignored the President's role in the 
legislative process because of the work involved in complete and 
155. There might be a separation of powers problem if the courts attempted to use presiden· 
tial documents under the pretext of "executive intent." That is to say, conceivably courts could 
use presidential documents as indicators of "executive intent" - a wholly distinct concept from 
legislative intent. The main problem, however, with giving independent weight under the guise 
of executive intent to presidential documents is that doing so circumvents the legislature and 
raises separation of powers concerns. Using executive intent in the statutory interpretation pro-
cess effectively eliminates the legislature from a role in the lawmaking process. Given that the 
Constitution on its face reserves "All legislative Powers" to Congress, allowing the President to 
create and then interpret the law seems to violate the separation of powers. 
156. Cf Starr, supra note 14, at 375 (arguing that courts should not use legislative history at 
all: "In terms of democratic theory, the use of legislative history can distort the proper voice of 
each branch of our constitutional government."). 
157. Id. at 376. 
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
159. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324-25 (1946) (Frankfurter, J,, concurring). 
More recently, the Supreme Court as a whole has recognized the President's legislative role. See 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947 (1983) ("It is beyond doubt that lawmaking was a power to be 
shared by both Houses and the President."). 
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proper investigations of legislative history.160 Adding presidential 
documents to the list of materials to be included in legislative history 
would undoubtedly increase the time courts spend evaluating certain 
statutory interpretation problems. The tremendous growth in the fed-
eral courts' caseloads over the past few decades exacerbates this con-
cern with increasing the obligations of the courts.161 
To argue, however, that incomplete analyses of legislative histories 
are acceptable due to increasing workload is merely to suggest expedi-
ency over accuracy as a long-term solution.162 Expansion of the do-
main of relevant materials would increase the courts' workload in a 
only few cases; the starting point for interpreting a statute should al-
ways be the language of the statute itself, so resort to legislative history 
is not always necessary.163 "[T]he Supreme Court has decided almost 
half of its statutory interpretation cases by reference to a statute's 
plain meaning in each of the last three Terms."164 Those few cases 
truly requiring an examination of legislative history merit a complete 
investigation, 165 not one unjustifiably proscribed by an avoidance of 
presidential materials. 
CONCLUSION 
Relevance is the standard for legislative history; it consists of all 
"relevant events comprising the enactment process."166 Presidential 
materials are relevant in that the Constitution specifically prescribes 
both proposals and veto messages as parts of the lawmaking process. 
Moreover, presidential documents may be not only relevant to but 
highly probative of what Congress actually intended, depending on the 
160. A. MAAss, supra note 40, at 13-14; cf. Starr, supra note 14, at 378. 
161. See generally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRlsIS AND REFORM 65 (1985) 
(noting the increase in court ofappeals cases from 3,765 in 1960 to 29,580 in 1984, an increase of 
686%). 
162. Usually, it is lawyers who initially research legislative history. Ordinarily courts will 
not undertake extensive independent research unless they find the lawyers' research inadequate. 
Therefore, adding presidential documents to the list of germane pieces of legislative history is 
unlikely in general to increase the courts' workload. 
163. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395 (1951) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting) (Courts should look to legislative history only when "the face of the Act is inescap-
ably ambiguous."); cf. Kozinski, Hunt/or Laws' "True" Meaning Subverts Justice, L.A. Daily J., 
Mar. 10, 1989, at 6, col. 3 (arguing against use of legislative history in statutory interpretation; 
"[Justice Frankfurter] would no doubt be shocked to pick up a legal publication and find adver-
tisement for the legal profession's latest cottage industry - legislative intent services."). 
164. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 656. 
165. The Supreme Court has often articulated the view that legislative history is to be consid-
ered in its totality. Cf. Allen v. State Bd. ofElections, 393 U.S. 544, 568-69 (1969) ("Indeed, in 
any case where the legislative hearings and debate are so voluminous, no single statement or 
excerpt of testimony can be conclusive."); Hust v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 328 U.S. 707, 733 
(1946) ("As is true with respect to all [legislative history] materials, it is possible to extract 
particular segments from the immediate and total context and come out with road signs pointing 
in opposite directions."). 
166. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
426 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:399 
particular statute involved and the activity level of the President. Fi-
nally, the President increasingly generates such materials and they are 
clearly available to both Congress and courts. 
It is certainly not a novel concept to identify the President as a 
major force in the creation of federal legislation. Nevertheless, the 
courts fail to accord the President's active participation in enacting 
legislation much concrete recognition when they are interpreting stat-
utes. This failure signifies a gap between what actually happens in the 
legislative process and what the courts are concluding. This Note sug-
gests that, in order to close the fissure, the courts look at all of legisla-
tive history, including the President's contribution; bridge the gap by 
giving the President an appropriate place in legislative history. 
- Kathryn Marie Dessayer 
